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Abstract 
As climate change raises sea levels (SLR) and exacerbates storm surges, the frequency 
and severity of coastal flooding will increase. Boston’s shoreline is increasingly vulnerable to 
flooding. Industries in the Designated Port Areas (DPAs) of Boston Harbor pose risks to public 
health and the environment because of toxic chemicals used and stored on-site. The goal of this 
project was to assess the vulnerability of DPAs in Boston harbor to SLR and coastal storms. We 
evaluated three different aspects of vulnerability: exposure, sensitivity, and ability to cope on 18 
different sites within four of Boston’s DPAs. Our report highlights the need for more systematic 
evaluation and planning by stakeholders to mitigate the risks associated with flooding due to 
SLR and coastal storm surge. 
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Executive Summary 
The goal of this project was to assess the vulnerability of Designated Port Areas in 
Boston Harbor to sea level rise and coastal storms. Boston is notably vulnerable to flooding 
events because of its proximity to three rivers and its position on the Atlantic Coast. Since 1991 
the City of Boston has experienced 21 flooding events that have triggered federal or state disaster 
declarations (Climate Ready Boston, 2016, P. 2). Over the entire twentieth century sea levels 
rose about 9 inches relative to land in Boston (Climate Ready Boston, 2016, P. 8). With the pace 
of relative sea levels rise accelerating, by 2030 another eight inches of sea level rise may 
occur, and as much as 3 ft. by 2070 (City of Boston Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2014). Severe 
flooding in Boston could result in damage to infrastructure, public health, environment and the 
economy (City of Boston, 2014). The Boston Hazard Mitigation Plan states that “In Boston, 
Massachusetts, the increase in flooding caused by sea level rise this century could cost up to $94 
billion from damage to buildings, loss of building contents, and associated emergency activities, 
depending on the amount of sea level rise and adaptation measures taken” (US EPA, n.d.). Areas 
within Boston Harbor will continue to have accelerated rates of vulnerability unless precautions 
are implemented to protect the coast from the effects of sea level rise.  
    Since 2007 Boston has maintained a climate action plan which details measures the city 
has taken, and intends to take, in order to mitigate the impacts of climate change. The City of 
Boston’s Climate Ready Report (Walsh, 2014), City of Boston Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan 
(The City of Boston, 2014), and Greenovate Boston (Greenovate Boston, 2012) are all parts of 
the city’s climate action plans. The plans that have been implemented come together to reduce 
the vulnerability to different climate risks. Vulnerability can be defined by three dimensions: the 
exposure to a threat, the sensitivity to a threat, and the ability to cope with a threat and its 
impacts. Although these reports and proposals do a thorough job of evaluating the vulnerability 
of residential and mixed use areas in Boston, they do not complete a thorough evaluation 
regarding the vulnerability of the working port. 
Boston is home to a vibrant working port that deals with a wide array of industries and 
employs a large number of people (Martin Associates, 2012). Boston specifically has areas 
classified as Designated Port Areas (DPA), which are set aside for water-dependent industrial 
uses on Boston’s coast. Our project has focused on the four inner harbor DPAs: Chelsea Creek, 
Mystic River, East Boston, and South Boston. The impacts associated with sea level rise and 
storm surge on industrial businesses along the harbor shoreline have not been evaluated (Climate 
Ready Boston, 2016). Understanding the vulnerability of harbor based industries is a crucial step 
for Boston to help identify the impacts of sea level rise and allow for better preventative 
measures to be taken in DPAs in the future. 
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Figure i: Inner Boston Harbor DPA Boundaries courtesy of Massachusetts Government. (2016). Chapter 91, The 
Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act | MassDEP. Retrieved April 24, 2017 
 
Assessing the Vulnerability of DPAs 
The DPAs of Boston’s inner harbor consist of over 60 water dependent industrial 
businesses. A representative sample of 18 parcels was investigated in our study. A list of the 
selected parcel can be seen in Table i.  
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Table i: Selected Parcels 
Name Of Business DPA Industry 
Preferred Freezer Mystic Cargo 
Distrigas of Massachusetts Everett Marine LNG Terminal 
Wharf 
Mystic Fuel 
Prolerized New England Co. Everett Wharf Mystic Cargo 
Winnisimmet Landing Pier No. 1-5 Mystic Mooring 
Constellation Mystic Power , LLC Mystic Station Wharf Mystic Old Industrial 
MA Port Authority, Paul W. Conley Marine Terminal Berth 
#14-17 
South 
Boston 
Vacant 
MA Port Authority, South Boston Ship Dock and Barge Dock South 
Boston 
Old Industrial 
Boston Marine Industrial Park Berth No. 6 South 
Boston 
Cargo 
Perini Corp. Quarterdeck Marina Chelsea Cargo 
Global Revco Terminal LLC Revere Terminal Ship Pier Chelsea Fuel 
Gulf Oil Chelsea Terminal Tanker Wharf Chelsea Fuel 
Vacant Land with Bulkhead Chelsea Vacant 
245 & 257 Marginal St. LLC Bulkhead Chelsea Vacant/Parkin
g 
Channel Fish Co. Inc. Pier Chelsea Fishing 
Irving Oil Terminals Inc Revere Terminal Pier Global Revco 
Berth No. 1 
Chelsea Fuel 
Mahoney Terminal LLC Chelsea (AKA Eastern Salt Co.) Chelsea Salt 
Boston Forging & Welding East Boston Boat Repair 
Boston Towing & Transportation; Boston Fuel Transportation East Boston Fuel 
  
The vulnerability of each parcel was assessed by looking at the exposure, sensitivity, and 
ability to cope to SLR and coastal storm surge. If the parcel was within the predicted flood zone 
from the Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map, then it was not deemed vulnerable in terms of exposure. 
Sensitivity was determined by the condition of the flood prevention infrastructure on the parcel 
and by whether or not the business on the parcel stores chemicals in large quantities. Ability to 
cope was determined by looking at the net worth of the business, what emergency flood plans the 
business had in place, and the potential cost of damages the business could receive from flooding 
from SLR and storm surge. Miscellaneous data was also gathered relating to the effects that DPA 
flooding could pose on the surrounding area. What we have evaluated are indicators for the 
corresponding dimensions of vulnerability, they are not direct measurements.  
Preliminary information for each of the 18 selected parcels was found online. Area, 
industry, chemical storage, land and building value,  as well as the net worth of the business 
could all be found on their city’s assessor's parcels (Boston, Chelsea, Everett, Revere). The 
predicted flood zone in and around the parcels was determined using Surging Seas: Risk Zone 
Map for 5ft of sea level rise by 2100, which is the likely estimate for emissions scenarios used in 
Climate Ready Boston (Climate Ready Boston, 2016). 
We attempted to get in touch with DPA businesses either through email or over the 
phone. The companies that got back to us were sent emails that contained variations of our 
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generic interview questions. They were given the option to respond by email or call us to go over 
their answers. We hoped their responses would give us insight to their day to day operations as 
well as their opinion of their vulnerability to SLR and coastal storms.  
A water taxi was taken out along the shorelines of the parcels that were selected. We took 
pictures of each site that we were able to visit on the taxi. Photos from the harbor were used in 
order to understand the current state of SLR infrastructure. We used these photos in conjunction 
with the 2009 Storm Smart Coasts CZM report to analyze the exposure of sites to SLR and 
coastal storm surge. 
 
Potential Vulnerability and Risks of DPAs 
We determined that Boston’s Inner Harbor DPAs are potentially vulnerable to sea level 
rise and coastal storm surge, as these areas have never fully been investigated. We have also 
found that this vulnerability has the potential to pose great risk to the city and its inhabitants.  
The immediate exposure to SLR and coastal storms greatly increases the vulnerability of 
the majority of parcels within Boston’s working port. Of the investigated parcels, 88% are 
expected to be in the predicted flood zone for 5 feet of SLR (Global climate change, n.d.). With 
the DPA’s direct access to the waterfront, they are exposed to the effects of SLR and coastal 
storms more than other areas of Boston. 
SLR preventative infrastructure on our selected DPA sites can be improved. Of our 18 
selected parcels, only 6 had publicly listed SLR preventative infrastructure (CZM, 2009). Of 
those 6 parcels, five were ranked as needing a moderate level of action or higher according to 
CZM (CZM, 2009).  
During our water taxi tour, we were able to look at some SLR preventative infrastructure. 
The high water mark on SLR preventative infrastructure was less than five feet from the top of 
the structures. Since 5 feet of SLR is expected by 2100, when coastal storms hit, these areas will 
most likely experience flooding. The SLR preventative infrastructure on these sites demonstrates 
the exposure to SLR and coastal storms, adding to the vulnerability of these working port areas. 
The fact that many businesses within the DPAs store hazardous chemicals on site makes 
them more sensitive to sea level rise. Many of the companies we evaluated would lose their 
ability to function for a time should their chemicals damaged or lost. Ten of the parcels in the 
sample use chemicals in their day to day operations. We know of nine chemicals that are present 
in large quantities within the DPAs. The sheer amount of these chemicals along the harbor, in 
addition to their hazardous nature, is alarming because in extreme events they may find their way 
into the harbor. For example, within the investigated parcels, there are over 345,811,200 gallons 
of fuel stored. The issues presented by the release of the chemicals could impact public health, 
the environment, and the economy of Boston. 
Based off of the information available to us, one third of the businesses investigated 
potentially have the resources to recover from severe flooding events. The sheer cost of the land 
and infrastructure on many of these parcels would make it difficult for businesses to rebuild after 
severe flooding. After reviewing the land and building value provided by tax assessor’s websites, 
we identified that out of the parcels investigated, 61% of them were worth over $1M. Only six of 
the eighteen businesses that we evaluated were publicly traded and those businesses were all 
worth well over $100M. The other twelve parcels are either abandoned or local businesses. 
During major flooding events, 66% of businesses are expected to have between $10M-$100M of 
predicted damage per acre. The other 33% are predicted to experience between $1M- $10M of 
damage per acre to their property. Since two thirds of all investigated businesses have no public 
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information on their net worth, one third of the businesses evaluated could possibly have the 
resources to rebuild after a severe flood.  
Based off of interviews and the information available to us, few of the businesses within 
the DPAs that we investigated have public emergency plans to deal with flooding. Of the 16 
businesses that we contacted, only two answered any of our interview questions. One of the 
businesses that we contacted said that they had an emergency plan in place, but that it was not 
public information. This lack of transparency regarding emergency planning makes it impossible 
to make any accurate statement on the level of preparedness that exists within the DPAs.  
We found that the regulation of the DPAs is split between MEMA, CZM, USCG, and the 
EPA. In our research of emergency preparedness plans within the DPAs, we conducted an 
interview with a hazard mitigation expert from MEMA, we learned that the only regulating body 
that deals with hazardous materials is local fire departments. Local fire departments enforce EPA 
regulations concerned with the handling of hazardous materials. The EPA only requires that 
businesses report the quantity of hazardous materials on their sites to their area fire department 
and the EPA. The Massachusetts Tier II Reporting Entities main purpose is to “provide the 
framework and methodology to efficiently respond to hazardous materials emergencies” 
(Hazardous materials emergency plan, 2011). The current regulations are reactionary in nature, 
only having plans for chemicals once they spill. We have found no measures in place to help 
prevent the release of toxic chemicals into the environment. The only other regulatory body that 
exists within Boston’s harbor is the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is mostly 
concerned with ships and materials that are moving on the water. They receive hazardous cargo 
manifests from ships entering the harbor in order to keep updated on the hazardous materials 
within Boston harbor. From our research it doesn’t seem that there is much communication 
between these groups. This lack of communication means that in an emergency situation 
important information may not be available to first responders. 
 
Recommendations to Better Prepare DPAs to SLR and Coastal Storms 
There are still major gaps in data concerning vulnerability of Boston to SLR and storm 
surges. Many of the vulnerability assessments do not address the DPAs in any capacity. As 
students reaching out to businesses, we found many unwilling to participate or even get back to 
us. Though we managed to gather a lot of information on DPAs in a short amount of time, there 
is a lot more data that should be gathered. We recommend that the Massachusetts Coastal Zone 
Management (CZM) and The Boston Green Ribbon Commission (GRC) continue their 
partnership and produce a vulnerability assessment of the DPAs. This is the partnership that 
produces the Climate Ready Boston report, which provides an in depth understanding of 
Boston’s vulnerability to climate change. With their previous experience, they can conduct a 
vulnerability assessment to give a more detailed description of the state that the DPAs are in. 
This report, in conjunction with the Climate Ready Boston report, could create a more complete 
understanding of the vulnerability of Boston and its harbor to climate change.  
Throughout the completion of this project, we found that there is no organization that 
directly regulates emergency preparedness plans in the DPAs. We recommend that 
Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management (CZM), the Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP), the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), and the United States 
Coast Guard (USCG) form a regulatory committee concerned with emergency preparedness 
plans within the DPAs. The partnership should integrate CZM’s knowledge of businesses and 
infrastructure within the DPAs, DEP’s experience with brownfield remediation, USCG’s 
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authority over the harbor and the cargo within it, and MEMAs experience with emergency 
management in Massachusetts. 
The committee should have a set of regulations to enforce on the DPA businesses. The 
two regulations that we are recommending this committee enforce are: that chemicals and 
hazardous materials used by businesses within the DPAs must be stored in flood-proof 
containers, and that more frequent inspections and repairs be performed on the SLR prevention 
infrastructure within the DPAs. The first regulation would reduce business sensitivity to SLR and 
coastal storms by reducing the risk of chemical spills. The second regulation would reduce the 
business's exposure to SLR and coastal storms by ensuring that the SLR prevention infrastructure 
on the sites are up to date and in good condition. 
If these regulations were to be put in place, they could reduce the vulnerability of DPA 
businesses to sea level rise and coastal storm surges by limiting exposure and sensitivity. This 
committee and its regulations would ensure that the unique needs of these industrial areas are 
met, while simultaneously keeping the surrounding communities and environment safe during 
flooding events.  
 
Conclusion 
Over the course of seven weeks we learned a lot about DPAs and their uniquely industrial 
nature. We understand that our work has limitations stemming from the short amount of time that 
we had to complete this project as well as the lack of transparency on the part of the DPA 
businesses. There still remains a gap in knowledge on the vulnerability of the DPAs, and further 
investigation is needed to fully understand Boston’s vulnerability to SLR and coastal storm 
surge. 
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Chapter 1.0: Introduction 
Climate change is a growing problem facing coastal cities. Though climate change is 
accompanied with many consequences, perhaps the most threatening to the populations of 
coastal urban cities are the rise in sea levels paired with the rise in coastal storm frequency. The 
impacts of coastal flooding on a city's infrastructure, public health, environment, and economy 
have been experienced throughout the country (US EPA,). These impacts can be highlighted 
during severe hurricanes. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans’ lack of adequate 
infrastructure coupled with the severity of the storm would lead to disaster for the city. The City 
of New Orleans did have levees in place in order to help minimize the effects of severe coastal 
storms, but those levees were “...built in a disjointed fashion using outdated data”(Hoar, 2006). 
In addition to major issues to infrastructure sea level rise and coastal storms are dangerous to 
public health. For example in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, flood waters from storms 
contained many different and dangerous chemicals (Sifferlin, 2017). Harvey’s flood waters were 
dangerous enough in Houston, Texas to cause death from flesh eating bacteria (Astor, 2017). 
Major flooding events also pose many dangers to the environment. For example, the impacts of 
Hurricane Sandy has caused significant damage to some local islands flora, an estimated 90% of 
the mature mangroves have been destroyed, and an estimated 100,000 gallons of fuel has spilled 
in the Simpson Bay Lagoon from over 120 shipwrecked vessels (Nature Foundation, 2017). 
Finally, the economy of area can also be greatly impacted by a severe coastal storm and SLR. 
During Hurricane Sandy, the New York Stock Exchange was forced to shut down for two days 
(Library, 2016).The impacts on infrastructure, public health, environment, and economy caused 
by these severe storms highlight some of the negative effects of extreme coastal flooding for 
modern port cities such as Boston. 
Boston is notably vulnerable to flooding events because of its proximity to three rivers 
and its position on the Atlantic Coast. Since 1991 the City of Boston has experienced 21 flooding 
events that have triggered federal or state disaster declarations (Climate Ready Boston, 2016, P. 
2). Over the entire twentieth century sea levels rose about 9 inches relative to land in Boston 
(Climate Ready Boston, 2016, pg. 8). With the pace of relative sea levels rise accelerating, by 
2030 another eight inches of sea level rise may occur, with about 1.5 ft. by 2050, and as much as 
3 ft. by 2070 (City of Boston Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2014). Thus the likelihood of coastal and 
riverine flooding will continue to increase. With higher sea levels, storm water outfalls may not 
be able to discharge or may even start to backflow (City of Boston Hazard Mitigation Plan, 
2014). Severe flooding in Boston could result in damage to infrastructure, public health, 
environment and economy similar to that experienced in New Orleans (City of Boston, 2014). 
The Boston Hazard Mitigation Plan states that “In Boston, Massachusetts, the increase in 
flooding caused by sea level rise this century could cost up to $94 billion from damage to 
buildings, loss of building contents, and associated emergency activities, depending on the 
amount of sea level rise and adaptation measures taken” (US EPA,). Areas within Boston Harbor 
will continue to have accelerated rates of vulnerability unless precautions are implemented to 
protect the coast, infrastructure, and people from the effects of sea level rise.  
    Since 2007 Boston has maintained a climate action plan which details measures the City 
has taken, and plans to take, in order to mitigate the impacts of climate change (City of Boston 
Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2014). The City of Boston’s Climate Ready Report (Walsh, 2014), City 
of Boston Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan (The City of Boston, 2014), and Greenovate Boston 
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(Greenovate Boston, 2012) are all parts of the city’s climate preparedness actions. The plans that 
have been implemented are intended to reduce the vulnerability to different climate risks, 
including exposure to threats, sensitivity to threats, and ability to cope after events occur 
(Bralower, 2017). With this in mind, some of the adaptations being implemented are to increase 
the amount of permeable ground, improving drainage systems, updating building codes, and 
restoring building and hazard mitigation infrastructure (The City of Boston, 2014). There are 
also several proposals being reviewed by the City of Boston with regards to different sea level 
rise adaptations, such as a large sea wall that completely surrounds the harbor. “City officials are 
exploring the feasibility of building a vast sea barrier from Hull to Deer Island, forming a 
protective arc around Boston Harbor” (Abel, 2017).  
Although these reports and proposals do a thorough job of evaluating the vulnerability of 
residential and mixed use areas in Boston, they do not complete a thorough evaluation regarding 
the vulnerability of the working port. 
        The goal of this project was to assess the vulnerability of designated port areas in Boston 
Harbor to sea level rise and coastal storms. Our project focused on the four inner harbor DPAs: 
Chelsea Creek, Mystic River, East Boston, and South Boston. We selected a sample of DPA 
businesses to represent each industry and DPA located within the harbor. An analysis of selected 
sites was conducted, by reviewing tax assessors info, interviewing business representatives, and 
looking at SLR prevention infrastructure to determine the overall vulnerability of Boston’s 
DPA’s. Our assessment resulted in a report that may be used to inform policy and interested 
stakeholders of the vulnerability of working port areas in Boston Harbor to sea level rise. 
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Chapter 2.0: Background on DPAs and Climate Change 
As sea levels rise and coastal storms become more frequent, it is necessary for coastal 
cities to understand their vulnerability. The City of Boston has done vulnerability assessments 
focused on residential and mixed use areas but no assessment of the DPAs has been conducted. 
In order to understand the context in which the DPAs exist, some background information is 
necessary. We will start by describing Boston Harbor and its designated port areas, then move 
into why there is an increased risk of severe flooding in the project area. We then address the 
negative effects that would be experienced during severe flooding events. 
2.1 Designated Port Areas in Boston Harbor  
 Boston is a historic city built around its harbor. Boston Harbor has emerged into a large 
trading market, which increased the industrialization of the city because of its location on the 
Atlantic Ocean. The harbor is critical to Boston’s economy. In 2012, $4.6 billion was generated 
by Boston’s port in overall economic value, while the business’ themselves generated $1.2 
billion in revenue (Woolhouse, 2014). Due to the port industry's importance to the economic 
value of Boston, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts wanted to protect more industrial sectors 
of the port from being displaced by non-industrial uses. Designated Port Areas (DPAs) were the 
regulatory mechanism created by the Commonwealth to ensure access to the water for water 
dependent industrial businesses. DPAs were created in 1978 by the Massachusetts Coastal Zone 
Management (CZM) “to satisfy both the unforeseeable and unanticipated space needs of 
industrial use that depend on the withdrawal/discharge of large volumes of process water” (New 
England School of Law, 2009).  Site characteristics and infrastructure needs of designated port 
areas include a developed waterfront, adjacent land suitable for industrial use, and access to land 
transportation for industrial purposes (Mass.gov, n.d.). 
 DPAs ensure that water dependent industries have access to Boston Harbor. There are 10 
DPA’s in Massachusetts, four of which will be the main focus of this project: Mystic River 
(Appendix A), Chelsea Creek (Appendix B), East Boston (Appendix C), and South Boston 
(Appendix D). A map of all four DPAs being investigated by our team can be seen in Figure 1. A 
variety industries utilize access to the waterfront that these DPAs provide. Some examples of 
industries within the DPAs are commercial fishing and processing, fuel transportation and 
storage, as well as import and export businesses. 
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Figure 1: Inner Boston Harbor DPA Boundaries courtesy of Massachusetts Government. 
(2016). Chapter 91, The Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act | MassDEP. Retrieved April 24, 2017. 
 
DPAs pose a threat to Boston Harbor. Industrial sites within DPAs often contain hazardous 
chemicals that if released would pose significant risks to Boston’s public health and environment. 
These threats are exacerbated with the threat of sea level rise and severe flooding events anticipated 
as a result of changing climate.  
2.2 Vulnerability of Coastal Cities to Major Flooding Events in a Time of Climate Change 
Impacts from climate change are not a new issue for the City of Boston. The City has 
been hit by 8 significant hurricanes in the past 75 years and has been developing different hazard 
mitigation preparations to minimize the risks from storm surge and storm water for over 100 
years. But, as the climate continues to change, the risk of coastal urban flooding is continuing to 
increase, and most cities are not prepared for the up-surging threats outlined in this section.  
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2.2.1 Sea Level Rise in the Northeastern United States 
Cities along coastal Northeastern United States are predicted to encounter escalating sea 
level rise (SLR). In the Northeast, the relative sea level has risen by approximately one foot, 
since 1900, which has caused more frequent flooding of coastal areas (Climate Change in the 
Northeast, 2016).  Boston’s sea level is predicted to have a minimum increase of 2.4 feet and a 
maximum of 7.4 feet, by the year of 2100, as shown in Figure 2 (Climate Ready Boston, 2016). 
Reducing Boston’s SLR to less than 2.4 feet. by the end of the century would require massive 
and unprecedented cuts in greenhouse gases worldwide (Climate Ready Boston, 2016).The lower 
end of this range assumes moderate cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions, with the upper end 
of this range assuming no changes in global emissions. SLR is driven by a combination of 
melting land ice, the expansion of water as its temperature increases, and changes in the amounts 
of water extracted from below ground or stored behind dams (Climate Change Indicators: Sea 
Level, 2014). Most of the coastal Northeast is expected to exceed the global average sea level 
rise due to local land subsidence, with the possibility of even greater regional sea level rise if the 
Gulf Stream weakens (Chapter 16 Northeast, 2014).Rising sea level will result in areas within 
coastal cities, such as Boston, to become more vulnerable to flooding by exacerbating impacts 
accompanied with storm surge.  
Figure 2: Predicted Sea Level Rise in Boston From: (2016). Climate Ready Boston, | City of Boston. 
Retrieved April 24, 2017 
2.2.2 Flooding From Storm Surge  
Another threat facing coastal urban cities is the predicted increase in severe coastal 
storms, which is intensifying by sea level rise (Pierre-Louis, 2017). A storm surge is an abnormal 
rise in sea level accompanying a hurricane or other intense storm, and whose height is the 
difference between the observed level of the sea surface and the level that would have occurred 
in the absence of the storm (Hurricane Science: Storm Surge, 2015). With global sea levels 
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already on the rise, storms will cause more flooding in the future than they would today. This is 
because “the higher water level provides a higher base for the waves so they are able to strike 
structures that might otherwise be elevated above the waves; effect and shore erosion caused by 
sea level rise allows the waves to strike farther inland”(Greenhouse effect and Sea Level Rise, 
2007). An example of an overwhelming and unanticipated storm surge coupled with 
precipitation, occurred during Hurricane Harvey. This hurricane unloaded nearly 33 trillion 
gallons of water in the U.S (Fritz & Samenow, 2017). This unprecedented amount of water had 
displaced over one million people and about 185,000 homes have been either damaged or 
destroyed across the Southeast US (Gallagher, 2017). Storm surges are particularly damaging in 
cities or other areas with high population densities, such as Boston.  
2.3  Impacts of Storm Surge and Coastal Urban Flooding 
Coastal urban flooding has many negative Impacts on its surroundings. Impacts of coastal 
flooding can affect infrastructure, public health, the environment, and the economy of coastal 
cities and regions. 
2.3.1  Failed Infrastructure Effects from SLR and Storm Surge 
As flooding severity worsens, the challenge of keeping important SLR prevention 
infrastructure, such as riprap and bulkheads, in good conditions increases. However, once the 
upkeep is not continued the infrastructure will deteriorate, putting it more at risk of failure under 
flooding conditions (Portland, 2014). 
 Failure of infrastructure during severe flooding events often exacerbates the issues caused 
by severe flooding. One potentially devastating form of infrastructure failure is the failure 
seawalls and other sea level rise prevention infrastructure. For example, if New Orleans had 
maintained their infrastructure, the flooding would not have been as detrimental from Hurricane 
Katrina: “Flood protection systems such as levee, canal systems, etc., were constructed to 
safeguard the city of New Orleans. However, these systems were poorly maintained and did not 
withstand the impact of the hurricane resulting in widespread damage to the city of New 
Orleans,” (Deshmukh et al., 2011). Upkeep of flood protection systems is critical to helping 
mitigate the impacts of SLR.  
 Similarly, the state of a building plays a role in the effect SLR has on it. The City of 
Boston has fully adopted the International Building Code (IBC) set of standards for building 
construction. The IBC does not adequately prepare the City of Boston for SLR (International 
Code Council, n.d.). To combat this, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has made its own 
modification to the IBC to be implemented in the state (Massachusetts Board of Building 
Regulations and Standards, 2010). Although these modifications improve upon the IBC in 
regards to SLR building code criteria, more research should be done to ensure that buildings are 
able to withstand more severe coastal flooding. The impacts of collapsed or damaged buildings 
would not only affect the aesthetic of the city, they could damage the health of the city’s 
residents. 
2.3.2  Impacts of Storms and Flooding on Public Health 
Floods pose many threats to the health of a community, including discharging pollutants 
into water and forcing people to reside within damp toxic living conditions. A major threat to 
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Boston’s public health from DPAs is the use and storage of harmful chemicals. If storage 
systems were to fail, dangerous chemicals have the ability to contaminate water. Some major 
hazardous materials that could spill into Boston Harbor are formaldehyde, petroleum, ammonia, 
and salt (Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines for Fish Processing, April 30, 2007). If 
during a severe flooding event these chemicals were to get into the water, they would have 
detrimental impacts on people’s health. 
Public health can also be negatively impacted from increased storms and floods that lead 
to damp air and living/working conditions (Climate Ready Boston, 2016). If the water does not 
dry completely, mold and mildew can start to appear in buildings. This was the case after 
Hurricane Sandy hit areas of New York (Nir, 2013). The dampened conditions lead to increased 
growth of black mold. Residents are subjected to increased allergen exposure due to mold 
growth in flooded homes and other structures (Climate Change Impacts in the Unites States, 
2014). Depending on the severity of the mold and mildew exposure, there can be various effects 
on the health of residents and citizens working in the area. Mold can cause minor effects such as 
coughing or something as serious as severe lung infections (National Center for Environmental 
Health, 2014). Many areas directly surrounding DPAs are residential, so flooding from SLR 
would likely have a negative impact on the public.  
2.3.3  Impacts of Storms and Flooding on the Environment 
Just as the public health is threatened by what can happen during sea level rise and storm 
surges, the environment is as well. In May, NOAA predicted a 45 percent chance that the 2017 
Atlantic Hurricane season—which runs from June 1 through November 30—would be more 
active than normal (Pierre-Louis, 2017). With increased water levels and severity of storms, 
there will be wider areas of ecosystems that will be vulnerable. Vulnerability assessments have 
been able to start looking at what the potential impacts on the environment could be (Climate 
Ready Boston, 2016). 
Wildlife faces many similar threats that the public does. Petroleum and salt are 
particularly hazardous to aquatic life. Another threat posed to the environment from SLR is the 
increase of runoff and sediment into waterways (Huston, 2010). Storm surge can cause more 
erosion and carry pollutants, into waterways and large bodies of water (Huston, 2010). This 
increase in pollutants can lead to increases in algal blooms (Huston, 2010) which are already a 
problem in Boston waterways. Algal blooms are one of the causes of a decrease in dissolved 
oxygen in water (Hewett, 2016). When there is less oxygen in the water fish and aquatic plants 
suffer because they do not have access to the needed amount of oxygen. Less oxygen also leads 
to higher water temperatures, which can cause distress for the aquatic life that is used to cooler 
temperatures (Hewett, 2016). 
2.3.4  Impacts of Storms and Flooding on the Economy 
 The economy of a region can be affected directly and indirectly by a changing climate. In 
the above sections, some of the general impacts of sea level rise, flooding, and storms have been 
described. In the end, all of these impacts can subsequently affect the economy of a region. Some 
effects from flooding will be more immediate, while others may take a while to appear and be 
fixed. Figure 3 below shows some of the potential long term or short term impacts that can come 
from flooding to coastal cities.  If important structures fall into disrepair, then they will need to 
be repaired (Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation, 2009). When Texas was 
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ravaged by Hurricane Harvey in 2017 many of the oil refineries on the coast were damaged and, 
“almost 22 percent of current oil production in the Gulf of Mexico has been ‘shut-in’...” (Rosoff, 
2017). Oil refining made up a majority of the economy in Texas’s ports, and it is predicted that 
because of Harvey, “it could be months or even years before the region is experiencing some 
sense of normalcy again” (O'Keefe & Williams, 2017). Harvey not only affected Texas’ 
economy, it had an impact on the whole country, “analysts said prices at the pump are likely to 
rise between 5 cents and 15 cents nationwide in the weeks ahead” (Ivanova, 2017). 
  
Figure 3: Effects of Flooding on Boston’s Economy 
2.4 Gaps in Knowledge 
The City of Boston has done quite a bit of work to protect residential and mixed-used 
areas from sea level rise, but there is still one area that the vulnerability assessments has not 
focused on: DPAs. A vulnerability assessment of the working port on the inner harbor of Boston 
has not been completed. Gaps in information include the exposure of DPAs to SLR and coastal 
storms, current state of infrastructure within the DPAs, the toxic chemicals stored within these 
DPAs and their potential effects on the harbor and its residents, as well as the ability for the 
working port to recover after damage occurs. Understanding the vulnerability of Boston’s 
working port to SLR and coastal storms is necessary. This understanding will allow Boston to 
have a complete idea of the risks posed to the city by SLR and coastal storm surge. 
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Chapter 3.0: Assessing the Vulnerability of DPAs 
The goal of this project was to assess the vulnerability of designated port areas in Boston 
Harbor to sea level rise and coastal storms. We focused on the four Boston inner harbor DPAs 
which are Chelsea Creek, Mystic River, East Boston, and South Boston (See Appendices A-D). 
Within these DPAs we selected a sample of parcels to represent the different industries. The 
vulnerability of individual parcels was assessed to help determine the vulnerability DPAs as a 
whole. Our project resulted in a report that has been given to Boston Harbor Now (BHN) for 
their use to inform policy and interested stakeholders of our findings. In this chapter we outline 
how we picked parcels and how the parcels were studied and evaluated. 
3.1 Selecting Parcels for Assessment  
 The DPAs of Boston’s inner harbor consist of over 60 water dependent industrial 
businesses. To complete a vulnerability assessment of these parcels, a representative sample of 
18 was selected, due the limited timeframe of this project. To reduce bias in our sampling 
process, we utilized random sampling to select each business. A database of parcels within the 
four inner harbor DPAs was obtained from Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management (CZM). 
We classified the businesses in the DPAs into eight different industries: mooring, cargo, fish 
processing, fuel, boat repair, salt, old industrial, and vacant/parking lots. Each industry is unique 
in how it operates, making each one vulnerable in different ways from each other. 
To accurately represent the DPAs, a variety of each industry needed to be selected. First, 
we calculated the percentage of land each industry occupied within the DPAs. Based on the 
percentage of land each industry took up, parcels were selected weighted to that percentage. For 
example, cargo occupied 20.52% of land within all four inner harbor DPAs, and 20% of 15 
parcels is roughly 4 parcels, therefore four cargo parcels were randomly selected (Appendix G). 
 In order to conduct a random sample, each parcel was assigned a number 1-55, 55 being 
the total amount of businesses. The parcels were grouped by industry. For example, Boat Repair 
included parcel numbers 1-9, Cargo was parcel numbers 10-21, and so on. Then to select the 
specific parcels, we randomly selected numbers using a Python script (Appendix F). We 
discovered two of the selected parcels were the same parcel but separated into two industries. 
This resulted in us having selected a total 14 businesses.   
 After we identified all of the parcels, we discovered that East Boston DPA was not 
represented. In order to ensure that each DPA and industry was represented in our study, we 
decided to add more parcels to our selection. Another random sample with just the parcels in the 
East Boston DPA was conducted, resulting in the selection of Boston Forging and Welding and 
Boston Towing and Transportation. Two industries were not represented in any of our random 
parcel selections: salt and fish processing. To select a salt parcel, we again ran the above script to 
randomly select one of the two salt parcels within the DPAs, which resulted in Eastern Salt Co. 
There was only one fish processing parcel to choose from: Channel Fish Co. The final selected 
businesses/parcels can be seen in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: List of Selected Businesses 
Name Of Business DPA Industry 
Preferred Freezer Mystic Cargo 
Distrigas of Massachusetts Everett Marine LNG Terminal 
Wharf 
Mystic Fuel 
Prolerized New England Co. Everett Wharf Mystic Cargo 
Winnisimmet Landing Pier No. 1-5 Mystic Mooring 
Constellation Mystic Power , LLC Mystic Station Wharf Mystic Old Industrial 
MA Port Authority, Paul W. Conley Marine Terminal Berth 
#14-17 
South 
Boston 
Vacant 
MA Port Authority, South Boston Ship Dock and Barge Dock South 
Boston 
Old Industrial 
Boston Marine Industrial Park Berth No. 6 South 
Boston 
Cargo 
Perini Corp. Quarterdeck Marina Chelsea Cargo 
Global Revco Terminal LLC Revere Terminal Ship Pier Chelsea Fuel 
Gulf Oil Chelsea Terminal Tanker Wharf Chelsea Fuel 
Vacant Land with Bulkhead Chelsea Vacant 
245 & 257 Marginal St. LLC Bulkhead Chelsea Vacant/Parkin
g 
Channel Fish Co. Inc. Pier Chelsea Fishing 
Irving Oil Terminals Inc Revere Terminal Pier Global Revco 
Berth No. 1 
Chelsea Fuel 
Mahoney Terminal LLC Chelsea (AKA Eastern Salt Co.) Chelsea Salt 
Boston Forging & Welding East Boston Boat Repair 
Boston Towing & Transportation; Boston Fuel Transportation East Boston Fuel 
3.2 Gathering Data 
 To characterize the vulnerability of each parcel, we gathered preliminary data from the 
internet, we attempted to interview representatives from each business, and conducted site 
reviews by water taxi. 
3.2.1 Gathering Data From Online Resources 
 Preliminary information for each selected parcel within the DPAs was found online. 
Area, industry, elevation, chemical storage, land and building value, as well as the net worth of 
the business could all be found on the respective city’s tax assessor's website (Boston, Chelsea, 
Everett, Revere). The predicted flood zone in and around the parcels was determined using 
Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map for 5ft of sea level rise by 2100, which is the likely/ middle of the 
road for emissions scenarios used in Climate Ready Boston (Climate Ready Boston, 2016). This 
same sea level rise viewer was used to gather the predicted property exposure, social 
vulnerability exposure, and the vulnerable population exposure of the population surrounding 
each parcel. 
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3.2.2 Contacting DPA Businesses Representatives  
 Using the contact information available to us, we attempted to get in touch with the 
businesses either through email or a phone call. We utilized a generic email template and phone 
script (Appendix H). The companies that got back to us were sent emails that contained 
variations of our generic interview questions (Appendix I). They were given the option to 
respond by email or call us to go over their answers. 
3.2.3 Evaluating Sites from the Water 
A water taxi was taken out along the shorelines of the parcels that were selected. Based 
on the location of our selected parcels and the location of shoreline stabilization structures, a 
water taxi route was mapped out (Appendix J). We took pictures of each site that we were able to 
get to with the taxi. We used these photos in conjunction with the 2009 Storm Smart Coasts 
CZM report in order to understand the current state of SLR infrastructure. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
 All of the data gathered through interviews and site visits was compiled into a 
spreadsheet. 
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Table 2: Selected DPA Parcel Data 
Vulnerability Evaluated  Source Why? 
 DPA CZM Spreadsheet What DPA the parcel is in. 
 Industry CZM Spreadsheet What industry the parcel is in. 
Exposure 
Area (sq ft) Assessor's Parcel Viewer More land exposed to flooding. 
In Predicted Flood Zone for 
SLR by 2100 (5ft SLR) (Y/N) Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map 
Parcel is predicted to be flooded 
by 2100. 
Sensitivity 
SLR Preventative 
Infrastructure 
Water Taxi/2009 Storm Smart 
Coasts 
Poor condition of SLR prevention 
infrastructure adds to sensitivity. 
Chemical Type CZM Spreadsheet 
Different chemicals are 
dangerous in different ways. 
Chemical Quantity CZM Spreadsheet 
High quantity of chemicals could 
cause more damage. 
Chemical Storage CZM Spreadsheet 
Proper chemical storage can 
prevent against chemical spills, 
lowering overall sensitivity.  
Building Condition Interviews  
Poor building condition adds to 
the parcels sensitivity to SLR and 
storm surge.  
 
Ability to 
Cope 
Predicted Property Exposure 
5ft Sea Level Rise (Price per 
acre) Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map 
Expensive damages require more 
money to repair. 
Net Worth of Business Assessor’s Parcel Viewer 
Smaller businesses may not be 
able to afford repairs. 
Emergency Plans Interviews 
How well a company can respond 
to flooding events and related 
outcomes affects their ability to 
cope. 
Misc. 
Social Vulnerability Exposure 
5ft SLR  Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map 
The citizens in the surrounding 
area’s ability to prepare and 
respond to flooding. 
Vulnerable Population 
Exposure 5ft SLR (People per 
square mile) Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map 
More vulnerable people 
surrounding parcel. 
Land and Building Value ($) Assessor’s Parcel Viewer 
Higher valued land/buildings may 
cost more to repair. 
 
The vulnerability of each parcel was assessed by looking at the exposure, sensitivity, and 
ability to cope to SLR and coastal storm surge. If the parcel was within the predicted flood zone 
from the Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map, then not was deemed vulnerable in terms of exposure. 
Sensitivity was determined by the condition of the flood prevention infrastructure on the parcel 
and by whether or not the business on the parcels stores chemicals in large quantities. Ability to 
cope was determined by looking at the net worth of the business, what emergency flood plans the 
business had in place, and the potential cost of damages the businesses could receive from 
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flooding from SLR and storm surge. Miscellaneous data were also gathered relating to the effects 
that DPA flooding could pose on the surrounding area shown in Table 2. What we have 
evaluated are indicators for the corresponding dimension of vulnerability, they are not direct 
measurements.  
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Chapter 4.0: Potential Vulnerability and Risks of DPAs 
Boston’s Inner Harbor DPAs are potentially vulnerable to sea level rise and coastal storm 
surge. There is a gap in knowledge as these areas have never fully been investigated. We have 
also found that this vulnerability has the potential to greatly impact the city and its inhabitants.  
This chapter outlines our findings relating to the three dimensions of vulnerability: 
exposure, sensitivity, and ability to cope. Within each of these dimensions, we have evaluated 
many different variables that all contribute to the parcels overall vulnerability. We also discuss 
the DPA’s potential impact on the city of Boston during flooding events. We then highlight the 
lack of transparency throughout the businesses within the DPAs in regards to contacting 
representatives and gathering information. 
4.1 - Exposure of DPAs to SLR and Coastal Storms 
 In order for an area to be vulnerable to SLR and coastal storms, it needs to be exposed to 
SLR and coastal storms. A sites location within Boston Harbor greatly affects its potential 
exposure. Depending on a sites elevation and proximity to the harbor, it will be exposed to 
different levels of flooding. 
4.1.1 - Predicted Flood Zones 
The exposure to SLR and coastal storms greatly increases the vulnerability of the 
majority of parcels within Boston’s working port. With moderate cuts in carbon emissions, the 
likely amount of sea level rise by the year 2100 is 5 ft (Global Climate Change, n.d.). Of the 
investigated parcels, 88% are expected to be underwater by 2100. With the DPA’s situated 
directly on the water, they are more exposed to the effects of SLR and coastal storms than other 
areas of Boston. Figures 4-7 are maps of the four DPA’s, showing the predicted flood zones 
(PFZ) during 5 ft SLR.  
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Figure 4: Chelsea Creek DPA Flood Zone From: (2017). Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map, | NOAA. 
Retrieved April 5, 2017 
  
 
Figure 5: Mystic River DPA Flood Zone From: (2017). Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map, | NOAA. 
Retrieved April 5, 2017 
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Figure 6: South Boston DPA Flood Zone From: (2017). Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map, | NOAA. 
Retrieved April 5, 2017 
 
 
Figure 7: East Boston DPA Flood Zone From: (2017). Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map, | NOAA. Retrieved 
April 5, 2017 
4.1.2 - DPA Business Interview Response Regarding Exposure 
In response to our interview questions, a representative from Channel Fish Co. Inc. said 
that he was very concerned for his business’s safety regarding SLR and coastal storms. This 
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representative stated “We are very concerned that our backyard could flood and portions of the 
property could be damaged by severe storms.” 
Channel Fish Co. is located in the East Boston DPA, with direct access to the waterfront 
along Chelsea Creek. The East Boston area has been prone to serious erosion along the coast, 
and is located within the boundaries of the PFZ with regards to 5 feet SLR, shown in Figure 7 
above. The representative stated that his business has been prone to flooding in the past, with an 
example of this flooding shown below in Figure 8.  In regards to flooding on this property, the 
representative said “It’s been pretty severe at times: the most recent occurrence on Aug. 2, the 
standing water was about a foot tall. It’s also gotten into our basement in the past.” 
 It is evident this business located within the DPA has extreme exposure to flooding, 
increasing its overall vulnerability to SLR and coastal storm surge. 
  
Figure 8: Flooding Within East Boston August 2, 2017 From: Margaret Farmer 
4.2 - Sensitivity to SLR and Coastal Storms 
A sites vulnerability to SLR and coastal storms is also a function of its sensitivity. For the 
purpose of this project, the sensitivity analysis is based on the state of the infrastructure on the 
parcel. The infrastructure that we evaluated included both the sea level rise prevention 
infrastructure, chemical type, chemical storage, and chemical quantity. These are all indicators of 
sensitivity that contribute to the overall vulnerability of a parcel. 
4.2.1 - Infrastructure Evaluations  
 SLR preventative infrastructure on DPA our selected DPA sites can be improved. Of our 
18 selected parcels, only 6 had publicly listed SLR preventative infrastructure (CZM, 2009). Of 
those 6 parcels, five were ranked as needing a moderate level of action or higher according to 
CZM (CZM, 2009) (Appendix K). After our water taxi tour, we did not have an adequate amount 
of information to correctly correlate each parcels SLR prevention infrastructure to the previous 
CZM report.  
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 During our water taxi tour, we were unable to visit all of the parcels from our sample due 
to limited time and travel restrictions. We were able to look at some SLR preventative 
infrastructure near some of the sites.  Figure 9 shows riprap located on Prolerized. It can be seen 
that the high water mark on the rocks is more than halfway up the structure. We were not able to 
gain the exact measurements of the height of the rip rap, but we can safely estimate there is less 
than 5 feet of riprap above the high water mark. This is concerning due to the fact that 5 feet of 
SLR is expected by 2100, and if coastal storms hit the area, they will most likely experience 
more than 5 feet of coastal storm surge, resulting in the Prolerized site being flooded. Similar 
flooding would be experienced at the Eastern Salt site under the same future conditions. As seen 
in Figure 10, the Eastern Salt parcel has bulkheads. However, the high water mark is also located 
less than 5 feet from the top of the structure. The quality of SLR prevention infrastructure on 
these sites demonstrates the exposure to SLR and coastal storms, adding to the vulnerability of 
these working port areas.  
 
Figure 9: Riprap located at Prolerized 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Bulkhead located at Eastern Salt 
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4.2.2 - Sensitivity due to Chemical Storage 
 The fact that many businesses within the DPAs rely on large amounts of chemicals stored 
on site to function makes them more sensitive to sea level rise. Different types of chemicals are 
stored differently. The condition of the storage facilities can contribute to how vulnerable the site 
is to flooding. The worse the condition is the more vulnerable the area is. Unfortunately we were 
unable to analyze the condition of the storage facilities themselves. Since we could not analyze 
the storage facilities we investigated which companies would lose their ability to function for a 
time should they damage or lose the chemicals. Ten of the parcels that we investigated use 
chemicals in their day to day operations. The companies that store chemicals on these ten parcels 
would not be able to function normally without their chemicals. This limit in their ability to 
function is what makes them vulnerable in the sense of chemical storage. 
 
Table 3: Chemical Storage Information 
Business Chemical Type Chemical Quantity Chemical Storage 
Preferred Freezer Ammonia N/A N/A 
Distrigas of 
Massachusetts 
Liquid Natural Gas 
(LNG) 
25,000 gallons 2 Cryogenic, 3 Tanks 
Constellation Mystic 
Power 
Petroleum/ LNG 590,000 barrels 4 Tanks 
MA Port Authority 
South Boston Ship 
and Barge Dock 
Petroleum 
Molasses 
2,292,000 barrels 
4,437,000 Gallons 
26 Tanks 
12 Steel Tanks 
Boston Marine 
Industrial Park Berth 
6 
Cement N/A 2 Storage Silos 
Global Revco 
Terminal 
Petroleum 1,400,000 Barrels 24 Steel Tanks 
Gulf Oil Petroleum 1,677,600 Barrels 21 Steel Tanks 
Channel Fish Co. Inc. 
Pier 
Salt 
Formaldehyde 
Ammonia  
N/A N/A 
Irving Oil Terminal Petroleum 1,300,000 Barrels 18 Steel Tanks 
Eastern Salt Salt 
Coal 
170,000 Tons Pile 
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4.3 Parcel’s Ability to Cope with SLR and Coastal Storms 
A site’s vulnerability is also a function of its ability to cope after a major flooding event 
has happened. If a site can respond and recover quickly from SLR or a major storm, they are less 
vulnerable to it. Things such as a business's worth and income can give some indication on a 
business's ability to reconstruct their site. Emergency plans that are in place when flooding 
occurs also will reduce that sites vulnerability to SLR and coastal storms. If a site has the ability 
to cope with SLR and coastal storms both during and after they occur, they are consequently less 
vulnerable. 
4.3.1 Financial Aspects 
The sheer cost of the land and infrastructure on many of these parcels would make it 
difficult for businesses rebuild after severe flooding. After reviewing the land and building value 
provided by tax assessor’s websites, we identified that out of the parcels investigated, 61% of 
them were worth over $1M. Only six of the eighteen businesses that we evaluated were publicly 
traded and those businesses were all worth well over $100M. The other twelve parcels are either 
abandoned or local businesses. During major flooding events, 66% of businesses are expected to 
have between $10M-$100M of predicted damage per acre. The other 33% is predicted to 
experience between $1M- $10M of damage per acre to their property. Since two thirds of all 
investigated businesses have no public information on their net worth, one third of the businesses 
evaluated could possibly have the resources to rebuild after a severe flood, this is still 
undetermined.  
4.3.2 - Emergency Plans 
 To our knowledge, few of the businesses within the DPAs have publicly available 
emergency plans to deal with flooding. One of the businesses that we contacted said that they 
had an emergency plan in place, but that it was not public information. Businesses are not 
required to make their emergency plans public, due to risks associated with terrorism. Through 
an interview with a hazard mitigation expert from MEMA, we learned that the only real 
regulating body that deals with hazardous materials is local fire departments. Local fire 
departments enforce EPA regulations concerned with the handling of hazardous materials. The 
EPA only requires that businesses report the quantity of hazardous materials on their sites to 
their area fire department and the EPA. According to the Massachusetts Tier II Reporting 
Entities, a source referred to us by MEMA, the hazard mitigation plan’s main purpose is to 
“provide the framework and methodology to efficiently respond to hazardous materials 
emergencies”(Hazardous materials emergency plan, 2011)(template version of Hazardous 
Materials Emergency Plan can be seen in Appendix L). The current regulations are reactionary in 
nature, only having plans for chemicals once they spill. We found no regulatory requirements to 
help prevent the release of toxic chemicals into the environment. 
 The only other agency that regulates industrial activities within Boston’s harbor is the 
United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is mostly concerned with ships and materials that 
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are moving on the water. They receive hazardous cargo manifests from ships entering the harbor 
in order to keep updated on the hazardous materials within Boston Harbor.  
 We learned that the regulation of the DPAs is split between MEMA, CZM, USCG, and 
the EPA. From our research it doesn’t seem that there is much communication between these 
groups. This is based off of our experience with these agencies representatives. We were 
continually being referred to different people within various state agencies, none of whom knew 
much about regulations within the DPAs. This lack of communication means that in an 
emergency situation important information may not be available to first responders. 
4.4 DPAs Impacts on Boston During Flooding Events  
 DPAs vulnerability to SLR and coastal storms is a problem, but the effects that those 
flooded DPAs may have on the surrounding areas is another issue. Populations that live behind 
these DPAs are at risk due to their proximity to the water as well as being exposed to the toxic 
chemicals that are stored on some DPA properties. The impacts of flooded DPAs on the 
surrounding areas of Boston is also a threat. 
4.4.1 Populations at Risk from Flooding in DPAs 
 Residential populations located directly behind the DPA’s can be vulnerable to the effects 
SLR. If you refer to the vulnerable populations table (Appendix M), you can see many of the 
inhabitants surrounding the DPA parcels will be exposed to the effects of SLR. Using the 
Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map we were able to apply Social Vulnerability and Vulnerable 
Population layers. The Social Vulnerability Exposure ranks how the population can prepare and 
react to SLR and flooding events. The businesses that have a rank of “Low” have populations 
behind them with low exposure, meaning they have a better ability to prepare and respond to the 
flooding. “High” means that the population surrounding the parcel are not able to respond and 
prepare well for flooding events. The Vulnerable Population Exposure is how many people per 
square mile that would be impacted by a 5 foot sea level rise. These show that the populations 
behind the DPA’s are vulnerable to SLR and coastal storms. During major flooding events, 
floodwater from the DPA’s pose the risk of spreading contaminants to the surrounding areas. 
This has the potential to exacerbate the impacts of flooding on the already vulnerable residential 
populations. 
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Table 4: Vulnerable Residential Populations Surrounding DPA’s 
Business Social Vulnerability 
Exposure 5 ft. SLR 
(Ability to prepare 
and respond to 
flooding) 
Vulnerable 
Population 
Exposure 5 ft. SLR 
(People per square 
mile) 
Preferred Freezer  Medium  None  
Distrigas of MA Everett Marine LNG Terminal 
Wharf  
Medium  None 
Polerized New England Co. Everett Wharf Medium  None 
Winnisimmet Landing Pier No. 1-5 High 1000-9999 
Constellation Mystic Power, LLC Mystic Station 
Wharf 
Medium  None  
MA Port Authority, Paul W. Conley Marine 
Terminal Berth #14-17 
N/A None  
MA Port Authority, South Boston Ship Dock and 
Barge Dock 
N/A None 
Boston Marine Industrial Park Berth No. 6 N/A 1000-9999 
Perini Corp. Quarterdeck Marina  Low 1000-9999 
Global Revco Terminal LLC Revere Terminal Ship 
Pier  
Low 1000-9999 
Gulf Oil Chelsea terminal Tanker Wharf  Medium  None 
Vacant Land with Bulkhead  High Below 100 
245 & 257 Marginal st. LLC Bulkhead Low 1000-9999 
Channel Fish Co. Inc. Pier  Low None 
Irving Oil Terminals Inc Revere Teminal Pier 
Global Revco Berth No. 1 
Low None 
Mahoney Terminal  LLC Chelsea (AKA Eastern 
Salt Co. ) 
High None 
Boston Forging & Welding High None 
Boston Towing & Transportation; Boston Fuel 
Transportation 
High None 
Info taken from Climate Central. (2016). Surging seas: Risk zone map. Retrieved from 
https://ss2.climatecentral.org/#12/40.7298/-74.0070?show=satellite&projections=0-RCP85-
SLR&level=5&unit=feet&pois=hide  
4.4.2 Risks Posed by Chemicals in the DPA 
 Many of the chemicals located in the harbor could have detrimental effects on Boston and 
the other cities bordering the harbor, demonstrated in Table 5. We know, from the CZM 
spreadsheet of parcels, of nine chemicals that are present in large quantities within the DPAs. 
The sheer amount of these chemicals along the harbor, in addition to their hazardous natures, is 
alarming because in extreme events they may find their way into the harbor. For example, within 
the investigated parcels, there are over 345,811,200 gallons of fuel stored. The issues presented 
by the release of the chemicals could impact public health, the environment, and the economy. 
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Table 5: Chemical Effects on Public Health and Environment 
Chemical Public Health Environment 
Petroleum (CHEMTREC, n.d.) Toxic Acute aquatic toxicity, 
flammable 
LNG (Elengy, 2014) Frostbite, severe burns Flammable 
Liquid Nitrogen(Airgas, 2016) Frostbite, severe burns N/A 
Salt (MSDS, n.d.) Skin irritant, eye irritant N/A 
Cane Molasses (Sugar 
Australia, n.d.) 
Eye irritant Depletes Oxygen levels in 
Water 
Ammonia (Airgas, 2017) Frostbite, severe burns Acute Aquatic Toxicity 
Formaldehyde (MSDS, n.d.) Toxic, Carcinogen Flammable 
Coal (URSI, 2008) Carcinogen Flammable 
Portland Cement (PPC, 2016) Skin irritant Lowers pH of water 
 
Of the nine chemicals that we know are present in the harbor, six of them are would 
cause harm to a person if they were exposed. Petroleum oil and formaldehyde are the only toxic 
chemicals to humans, while formaldehyde and coal dust are classified as carcinogens. The other 
three chemicals that we identified as being dangerous to public health are ammonia, liquid 
natural gas, and liquid nitrogen. These chemicals are stored under great pressure in their liquid 
form, once exposed to the atmosphere, they would vaporize, making them less likely to be 
ingested. Despite this, they can still be very harmful. Each can cause severe burns similar to 
frostbite. They are also dangerous if inhaled and can cause unconsciousness. Rock salt, portland 
cement, and cane molasses are all relatively safe for humans to be around. The first two can 
cause skin irritation while all three can cause eye irritation. Chemicals pose many dangers to the 
environment as well. 
Flooding could cause facilities’ chemical storage to leak. Petroleum and ammonia are 
both chemicals that are acutely toxic to aquatic life. Portland cement can change the pH of the 
water and the molasses will lower the oxygen levels; these effects would lead to a heightened 
mortality of aquatic life. In addition to being toxic and unstable, four of the chemicals are highly 
flammable. Should they get into the harbor many of them will not mix with the water. Should 
this mixture of chemicals somehow come into contact with a spark or flame, it could cause a 
large portion of the harbor to catch on fire. Leakage of chemicals could also cause a detrimental 
effect on the economics of region. 
Both salt and petroleum would impact the economy of the surrounding area in more 
severe ways than the other chemicals that we are aware of. The salt pile in Chelsea is the main 
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source of rock salt for the roads in the Greater Boston area. If the large portions of the salt were 
to be washed away, the Boston Metropolitan Area would need to obtain salt from elsewhere in 
short notice. Boston could also lose a large amount of petroleum during major flooding events. 
With Logan International Airport being one of the largest consumers of petroleum in the area, 
with over 38,000 passenger flights in August 2017 alone (MassPort, 2017), it would be greatly 
impacted should the petroleum in the DPAs be lost. Planes would not be able to refuel at the 
airport for some time, effectively shutting it down. 
4.5 Lack of Transparency Within the DPAs 
 The businesses in the DPA lack transparency about flooding preparedness. Of the 16 
businesses that we contacted, only two responded to us. We emailed a set of 15 different 
questions to the businesses. The response below was all we had received from one of the 
business representatives. 
 
In response to your questions below, the... [Parcel]...has not had a problem with 
flooding at this facility in the past, nor do we foresee any problems for the future. 
This facility is highly regulated, and those regulations call for contingency plans 
to cover all types of scenarios, from natural disasters to manmade events.  These 
contingency plans are not public information. 
 
This shows how difficult it has been for us to get information from these businesses. We 
were unable to gather a lot of data about different businesses beyond what is publically available 
online. This lack of transparency makes it impossible to make any accurate statement on the 
level of preparedness that exists within the DPAs. Without clear communication from DPA 
businesses about their SLR preparedness, neither the city of Boston nor a third-party could 
accurately predict the effects of flooding in the Boston area. This lack of transparency may come 
down to the fact that we are college students and businesses may not have been sure of our 
intentions, possibly afraid of self-incriminating answers. 
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Chapter 5.0: Recommendations to Better Prepare DPAs to 
SLR and Coastal Storms 
Within Boston’s inner harbor DPAs, many improvements can be made to planning and 
regulations in order to reduce their vulnerability to SLR and coastal storms. Further research can 
also be conducted in order to further evaluate the vulnerability of DPAs in the harbor. A 
committee that could regulate DPA businesses’ emergency preparedness plans as well 
infrastructure evaluations could help to decrease their vulnerability. 
5.1 Recommendations to Better Understand Vulnerability within DPAs  
Major gaps in data concerning vulnerability of Boston to the sea level rise and storm 
surges still exist. The vulnerability assessment, Climate Ready Boston does not address the 
DPAs in any capacity. As students reaching out to businesses, we found many unwilling to 
participate or even get back to us. Though we managed to gather a lot of information on DPAs in 
a short amount of time, a lot more data regarding the businesses in the DPA’s should still be 
gathered.  
We recommend that the Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management (CZM) and The 
Boston Green Ribbon Commission (GRC) continue their partnership and produce a vulnerability 
assessment of the DPAs. This is the partnership that produces the Climate Ready Boston report, 
which provides an in depth understanding of Boston’s vulnerability to climate change. With their 
previous experience, they can conduct their own vulnerability assessment that will give a more 
detailed description of the state that the DPAs are in. This report, in conjunction with the Climate 
Ready Boston report, will create a more complete understanding of the vulnerability of Boston 
and its harbor to Climate Change. 
5.1.1 Use of More Sophisticated Models for Vulnerability Assessments  
 To complete our initial vulnerability assessment of the given DPA’s parcels we utilized 
the Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map to gather information about potential flood zones. Using this 
source we were able to gather some preliminary information about sea level rise and its effects 
on the harbor, but no detailed information such as flood depths were available for our group. 
According to Paul Kirshen, a professor at the University of Massachusetts Boston, the Surging 
Seas: Risk Zone Map uses the “bathtub model” to predict sea level rise. This model is not the 
most detailed and or accurate ways to predict sea level rise. As we neared the end of our project, 
we were given access to an extremely accurate sea level rise viewer that is not open to the public, 
courtesy of the Massachusetts Department of Transportation. Due to the lack of time we were not 
able to utilize these GIS maps to their fullest potential. An example of this GIS can be found 
below in Figure 11. We recommend that whoever continues this research within the DPA’s 
should utilize this resource as it will add extremely accurate and in depth data.  
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Figure 11:Potential Flooding of 5 Feet with Spring Tide From: given citation (2017). MassDOT-FHWA Pilot 
Project Report, | Bosma et. al.. Retrieved October 3, 2017 
5.2 Centralized Regulations for Emergency Preparedness Plans 
Throughout the completion of this project, we found that no existing organization directly 
regulates emergency preparedness plans in the DPAs. We believe this to be a serious issue.  
During Hurricane Harvey the Akema chemical plant in Crosby Texas lost power to its 
refrigeration units. These units were critical as without them, the stored chemicals would ignite 
and explode (Gallagher, 2017). Had the Akema chemical plant been required to keep an updated 
flood preparedness plan, it may not have lost power to its refrigeration units. 
 Without a centralized organization governing emergency preparedness in these industrial 
areas, the City of Boston cannot be certain that the businesses will be prepared to handle 
flooding events.  We recommend that Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management (CZM), the 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the Massachusetts Emergency Management 
Agency (MEMA), and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) form a regulatory committee 
concerned with emergency preparedness plans within the DPAs. The partnership should integrate 
CZM’s knowledge of businesses and infrastructure within the DPAs, DEP’s experience with 
brownfield remediation, USCG’s authority over the harbor and the cargo within it, and MEMAs 
experience with emergency management in Massachusetts. 
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The committee should have a set of regulations to enforce on the DPA businesses. The 
two regulations that we are recommending this committee enforce are: that chemicals and 
hazardous materials used by businesses within the DPAs must be stored in flood-proof 
containers, and that more frequent inspections and repairs be performed on the SLR prevention 
infrastructure within the DPAs. The first regulation would reduce business sensitivity to SLR and 
coastal storms by reducing the risk of chemical spills. The second regulation would reduce the 
business's exposure to SLR and coastal storms by ensuring that the SLR prevention infrastructure 
on the sites are up to date and in good condition. 
If these regulations were to be put in place, the city could be more confident that the DPA 
businesses may better withstand flooding events. These regulations could reduce the 
vulnerability of DPA businesses to sea level rise and coastal storm surges by limiting exposure 
and sensitivity. This committee and its regulations would ensure that the unique needs of these 
industrial areas are met, while simultaneously keeping the surrounding communities and 
environment safe during flooding events.  
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Chapter 6.0: Conclusions  
The goal of this project was to assess the vulnerability of designated port areas in Boston 
harbor to sea level rise and coastal storms. By selecting a sample of representative parcels within 
the four inner Boston Harbor DPA’s, we were able to gain a representative sample of DPA 
businesses that could then be analyzed for their vulnerability to SLR and coastal storms. Three 
dimensions of vulnerability were considered for each parcel: exposure, sensitivity, and ability to 
cope to SLR and coastal storms.  
In spite of data limitations, we discovered that many of the sites in Boston Harbor are 
within the predicted flood zone for 2100, and many things including chemicals, poor 
infrastructure, and lack of planning on those sites cause them to be more vulnerable to SLR and 
coastal storms. The reluctance of businesses to answer questions puts further emphasis on the 
importance of this problem. Also, the lack of central regulation of emergency preparedness plans 
within the Boston Harbor DPAs is very concerning. The combination of these problems may put 
Boston in an underprepared state to deal with SLR and coastal storms.  
Boston Harbor’s ecosystem could be damaged, billions of dollars could be lost, homes 
destroyed, and lives threatened. The City of Boston has started to prepare for SLR and coastal 
storms with their reports such as Climate Ready Boston and Greenovate Boston, but a plan for 
industrial port areas does not yet exist. This gap in planning is a problem for Boston. Our group 
concludes that a committee be developed in order to review and regulate DPA businesses 
emergency preparedness plans, as well as that further research be conducted into this topic. 
Boston Harbor’s DPAs are multifaceted areas that vulnerability needs to be more fully evaluated. 
Modern port cities, such as Boston, are being increasingly threatened by SLR and coastal 
storms. Major cities around the country, such as New York, Houston, and New Orleans, have 
been impacted by hurricanes throughout the past 20 years. The storms that hit these cities caused 
major negative impacts to the area's infrastructure, public health, environment, and economy, 
devastating the region. For example, in 2012 when Hurricane Sandy hit Staten Island, 23 people 
died, many by drowning in flood waters (Sandy and its Impacts.2012). When Hurricane Harvey 
hit Texas in 2017 much of the oil refining that made up a majority of the economy in Texas’s 
ports, was damaged. “It could be months or even years before the region is experiencing some 
sense of normalcy again” (O'Keefe & Williams, 2017). In 2005 when Hurricane Katrina hit New 
Orleans, the lack of adequate infrastructure coupled with the severity of the storm lead to disaster 
for the city. The City of New Orleans did have levees in place in order to help minimize the 
effects of severe coastal storms, but those levees were “...built in a disjointed fashion using 
outdated data”(Hoar, 2006). Storms such as Hurricane Katrina, Sandy, Harvey, and Irma 
highlight the imminent threat that SLR and coastal storms pose to coastal cities. Port cities 
around the world need to learn from these storms and prepare for coastal flooding to help reduce 
the negative impacts. 
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Chapter 8.0: Appendices 
Appendix A: Mystic River DPA Boundaries 
The following DPA boundary maps outline DPA boundaries. 
 
 
Mystic River DPA Boundaries courtesy of Massachusetts Government. (2016). Chapter 91, The Massachusetts 
Public Waterfront Act | MassDEP. Retrieved April 24, 2017. 
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Appendix B: Chelsea Creek DPA Boundaries 
 
Chelsea Creek DPA Boundaries courtesy of Massachusetts Government. (2016). Chapter 91, The Massachusetts 
Public Waterfront Act | MassDEP. Retrieved April 24, 2017. 
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Appendix C: South Boston DPA Boundaries 
 
South Boston DPA Boundaries courtesy of Massachusetts Government. (2016). Chapter 91, The Massachusetts 
Public Waterfront Act | MassDEP. Retrieved April 24, 2017. 
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Appendix D: East Boston DPA Boundaries 
 
 
East Boston DPA Boundaries courtesy of Massachusetts Government. (2016). Chapter 91, The Massachusetts 
Public Waterfront Act | MassDEP. Retrieved April 24, 2017  
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Appendix E: Boston Inner Harbor DPA Boundaries 
 
Inner Boston Harbor DPA Boundaries courtesy of Massachusetts Government. (2016). Chapter 91, The 
Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act | MassDEP. Retrieved April 24, 2017. 
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Appendix F: Python Code 
 
This is the Python 3.5 code for our parcel picking process 
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Appendix G: Parcel Land Use 
 
Industry % of land used Number of parcels selected 
Boat Repair 9.72 0 
Cargo 20.52 4 
Fish Processing 0.28 0 
Fuel 35.25 5 
Mooring 7.83 1 
Old Industrial 16.52 2 
Salt 0.59 0 
Vacant/Parking 9.13 3 
 
This is a table showing the percentage of land in the DPAs used by each industry. These 
percentages were used to weight our random sample.  
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Appendix H: Generic Email and Phone Script 
Dear____________, 
 
We are a team of four Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) students completing 
our Interactive Qualifying Project (IQP), which is a research project all students 
are required to complete in order to graduate. For our project, our sponsor is the 
nonprofit Boston Harbor Now. We are gathering data about specific businesses 
within the Designated Port Areas of Boston Harbor and we were hoping to ask 
you a few questions about your business. We are on a tight schedule and it would 
be helpful if we could hear back from you by September 15th. If you would be 
willing to meet with us either in person or over the phone it would be greatly 
appreciated. You can contact us at boston17harbor@bostonharbornow.org. 
 
Thank you, 
Austen Crawford, Caroline Warchol, Jacob Bouchard, And Kyle Whittaker 
This is the generic email that we initially sent out to each DPA business that we wanted to talk 
to. 
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Appendix I: Generic Questions 
1. How long have you been working at______? 
2. What is your job here? 
3. What does your business “do” (have specific questions based on the 
business) 
4. Have you experienced flooding in the past? 
a. If so, how severe was it and how did you cope? 
b. What are your emergency flooding plans at this company? 
5. Are you familiar with the SLR prevention infrastructure on your property? 
a. If so, do you believe it to be in good condition? 
b. Did it help to prevent/ lessen the flooding 
6. When was this building last refurbished/updated? 
7. What types of chemicals does this company use? 
a. How are they stored? 
b. Has your company thought about changing the way chemicals are 
stored? 
8. Is your company concerned about SLR or severe storms? 
a. Are there any plans being made to address these concerns 
This is the list of generic questions that we asked businesses to answer either over the phone or 
through email. 
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Appendix J: Water Taxi Route 
 
This the map of the route that we planned to take on our water taxi. In reality we did not go as far 
up Chelsea Creek. 
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Appendix K: CZM Infrastructure Sheets 
These structure assessment forms were taken from CZM’s Coastal Infrastructure Inventory and 
Assessment. The below forms are for structures on our selected parcels. 
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Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation Office of Waterways. (2009). Massachusetts 
coastal infrastructure inventory and assessment project. (). 
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Appendix L: Hazardous Materials Emergency Plan 
  
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY 
_____________________________ 
  
MASSACHUSETTS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
400 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01702-5399 
  
TO:               Massachusetts Tier II Reporting Entities 
   
FROM:          Kurt N. Schwartz 
Director, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency 
Chair, Massachusetts State Emergency Response Commission 
  
THROUGH:  Massachusetts State Emergency Response Commission 
  
CC:               Massachusetts Emergency Planning Committees and Fire Departments 
  
RE:               Tier II Reporting Year 2016: Massachusetts State Emergency Response 
Commission Reporting Requirements 
  
DATE:          December 29, 2016 
  
  
Facilities covered by the reporting requirements of the federal Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) must submit Tier II reports to their: Emergency 
Planning Committee (EPC), their Local Fire Department, and the State Emergency 
Response Commission (SERC) annually. Tier II Reports for 2016 must be filed by March 1, 
2017. 
  
The Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) has, per Governor’s 
Executive Memorandum, been designated as the State Emergency Response Commission 
(SERC) in Massachusetts. 
  
This memorandum is being sent to Massachusetts Tier II reporting entities on behalf of the 
Massachusetts SERC. This memorandum is specific to the Massachusetts SERC Tier II 
reporting requirements for Reporting Year (RY) 2016. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
For Reporting Year 2016, the Massachusetts SERC will require filers to submit reports via 
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the web-based Tier II Manager System. The SERC will not accept reports developed or 
submitted via other means. 
  
This only affects how Tier II reports are submitted to the Massachusetts SERC; this does 
not change any Massachusetts EPC and/or Fire Department reporting requirements. 
  
Filers should contact their respective EPC and Fire Department regarding their reporting 
requirements. 
  
  
The fact that you are receiving this memorandum does not necessarily mean you are 
required to file a Tier II report.  It does mean you should determine whether the federal Tier 
II regulations are applicable to your facility. Please use the reference table below to assist in 
this determination. 
  
Tier II reporting thresholds: 
  
Extremely hazardous 
substances (EHS)* 
500 pounds (227 kg) or threshold planning 
quantity, whichever is less. 
All other hazardous substances: 10,000 pounds (4,540 kg) for any material 
that has an SDS 
*You may obtain a list of EHS substances on the EPA website here: 
https://www.epa.gov/epcra/final-rule-extremely-hazardous-substance-list-
and-threshold-planning-quantities-emergency 
  
  
  
Use of the Tier II Manager System: 
  
The Tier II Manager System is now ready for 2016 reporting.  The URL for the Tier II system 
is: http://massachusetts.idsimaps.com. 
  
New filers must first register to use the Tier II Manager System. Registration is a one-time 
process; if you have already registered you do not need to do so again. 
  
To register, please follow the steps outlined within MEMA’s Tier II Manager System: Filer 
Registration Process memo, which may be found on MEMA’s website at: 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/mema/resources/serc/. This memo also contains the 
system requirements needed to use the Tier II Manager System. Once you have successfully 
registered, you may use the Tier II Manager System. 
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If you have lost or forgotten your Username and/or Password, you may re-set them via the 
System’s website. 
  
If you have filed a Tier II report with MEMA in a prior year, but do not see this in the System 
please contact MEMA for assistance. 
  
A User’s Guide (comprised of powerpoint slides and FAQ’s) and training video will be 
available on the Tier II Manager System website. To access the User’s Guide materials, log-
in to the System, click Continue, then click the green ‘?’ 
  
A link to the training video will be on the Tier II Manager System’s home page. The training 
video provides an overview on how to access and use the System, including changes to the 
System’s ‘export tool’. MEMA highly recommends that filers review the User’s Guide 
materials and/or training video prior to developing their RY 2016 report. 
  
  
  
  
To facilitate use of the Tier II Manager System by filers, MEMA is providing a ‘Tier II 
Submit export tool’ within the Tier II Manager System. There have been some changes to 
this tool, and directions on use of this tool may be found within the User’s Guide materials 
and training video. 
  
Once a filer completes and submits a report via the Tier II Manager System, the export 
tool will convert their report into a format that may be used with the EPA’s Tier II Submit 
software and CAMEO.  
  
The converted file may then be submitted – by the filer – to its respective EPC and Fire 
Department per their reporting requirements. 
  
As a change from last year, the exported reports function will work off-line. This is being 
done to minimize disruptions to the System. Detailed instructions on use of the export tool 
may be found in the User’s Guide materials and training video. As an additional change, 
exported reports will be converted directly into a .t2s format that is compatible with the 
EPA’s Tier II Submit software. 
  
Once you have created a file using the Export Tool it is important that you carefully review 
the export file to ensure that it is accurate.  In particular, if converting a Tier II Manager file 
to a Tier II Submit file, you may receive  Tier II Submit validation errors for: attachments 
over 2MB; latitude and longitude coordinates; NAICS codes; or facility contact last name. If 
you receive a validation error, you must open the Tier II Submit file and manually correct 
the information before the file is sent to the EPC and/or FD. 
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Massachusetts-Specific Tier II Reporting Fields: 
  
Massachusetts uses state-specific Tier II data fields and guidance on how filers should 
complete these fields is found within the Tier II Manager System. 
  
  
Other SERC Tier II Reporting Information: 
  
The following apply to the Massachusetts SERC. Your EPC and/or Fire Department may 
have different reporting requirements. 
  
§  If you submit a report via the Tier II Manager System you will receive an automatic reply 
acknowledging receipt. 
  
§  Submitting a report via the Tier II Manager System does NOT fulfill your EPC and Fire 
Department reporting requirement. Filers must still submit reports to their respective EPC 
and Fire Department. 
  
§  There is no filing fee for the SERC. 
  
§  The SERC does not require submission of SDS’ or facility site plans. 
  
§  A list of EPCs in Massachusetts may be found on MEMA’s website here: 
http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/mema/resources/serc/all-epc-spreadsheet-november-
2016.pdf 
  
If you have any questions regarding this memorandum please contact Mayra Quintana 
(508.820.204; Mayra.Quintana@state.ma.us); Jeff Timperi (508.820.2019; 
Jeff.Timperi@state.ma.us); or Paula Krumsiek (508.820.1424; Paula.Krumsiek@state.ma.us). 
 
From: http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/mema/resources/serc/ 
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Appendix M: Vulnerable Population Maps 
 
Boston Inner Harbor Vulnerability Population Exposure Map From: (2017). Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map, | 
NOAA. Retrieved April 5, 2017 
 
This map defines social vulnerability as the ability of communities to prepare and 
respond to hazards like flooding. "High" and "low" indicate the 20% most and least vulnerable in 
coastal areas of each state during a 5 ft. SLR scenario. The yellow color represents low exposure, 
orange represents medium exposure, and red represents high exposure. Census tract resolution 
data. Data source: Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute (HVRI)'s Social Vulnerability 
Index. (Map layer currently available only within the U.S.)  
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Boston Inner Harbor Affected Population Map From: (2017). Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map, | NOAA. Retrieved 
April 5, 2017 
 
This map shows the people per square mile exposed to flooding events during 5 ft SLR. The key 
for this map can be seen below. 
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